-2 -This, in turn, leads to poor-paying jobs (or no jobs at all), causing individuals to seek poor housing usually found in the "ghetto." Thus, the cycle of segregation repeats itself from generation to generation. To break it, public action must be taken in all three areas. Since education appears to be essential to higher achievement, however, action in this area must be taken now. These arguments are basically the ones advanced by the disputants in the community we examined.
The study described in the present paper focused on the evolution of an educational policy aimed at eliminating de facto school segregation.
The problem, as we saw it, was to examine the process of community decision-making in the area of education with specific reference to school integration. In order to do this, we attempted the following: (1) to determine the sequence of action in the case being studied; (2) to understand the structure and dynamics of "democratic" action in Centerline; (3) to examine the functional relationships among the public, the Board of Education, and the professional administration of the school system; (4) to determine the relative contributions of particular individuals and groups to community decisions about education; (5) to determine the involvement or lack of involvement of various institutional systems within the community in regard to educational matters; and (6) to explore how local decisions about education and school integration were affected by extra-community influences. In the course of the study, Isolavant documents were examined (including minutes of public and confi--3 dential meetings, research reports, policy statements, and newspaper reports), in-depth interview's were conducted with close to forty key participants in the critical events that occurred, and observations were made of meetings and public hearings.
Interview subjects included members of the Board of Education, school administrators, members of a special committee asked by the Mayor and the Board of Education to assist in alleviating the situation, individuals connected with the various protest groups, and other community figures. All potential interview subjects were assured that the material would be confidential. None declined to be interviewed. Written information was also solicited from these individuals, and we believe that our documentation is most complete. The interviews proved to be the most helpful source of information. They were either taped or recorded manually, apparently with equal success. Copies of the recorded interviews were returned to each subject for comment or revision. Ambiguous reports and interpretations were often clarified through the comparison of interview protocols with one another and with relevant documents. Despite strong ideological differences among the subjects, their reports of what had happened were notable in their consistency.
The findings are presented in three parts: (1) an introduction to the community, the school system, and the problem; (2) the description and analysis of events relating to the problem of de facto school segregation as they occurred during the three-year period from May, 1962 , -4 -to September, 1965 and (3) conclusions that may be drawn from this study with potential implications for other communities. Necessarily, this presentation is abbreviated; more detailed evidence and conclusions will be presented later.
THE COMMUNITY AND ITS SCHOOLS
"Centerline" (a pseudonym for the community studied) is a mediumsized, northern, urban community. It serves as a commercial and employment center for close to 500, 000 people. Its economic base is in industry a mixture of electronics, chemicals, drugs, and machinery.
The city is abot..: 150 years old. Its population is about 7 per cent Negros concentrated primarily in the center of the city. As of 1962, when the problem of de facto school segregation in Centerline first came to public attention, the city had three schools with nonwhite populations 'yell over 50 per cent. Schools adjacent to the Negro ghetto had nonwhite populations approaching 35 per cent.
A seven-member Board of Education is the repository of authority and responsibility for educational matters in the Centerline City School District, which serves approximately 30, 000 children. The Board is composed of laymen nominated by party county conventions and elected at-large to serve staggered terms of four years each. The majority of Board members and in some years, all of the Board members come from the dominant political party, which is generally conservative in out--5 -look. Although the Board is officially responsible for educational policy and administration, financial planning responsibilities are shared with the city government, which must approve decisions in this area. The
Board submits an annual budget (in recent years, over $20 million) to the city's Board of Estimate, composed of the Mayor, the President of the City Council, and the Mayor's financial advisor. The school system (under the direction of the Superintendent) administers the budget after it is approved. Supplemental fund requests must also be channeled through About 450 youngsters were slated for reassignMent, about half of them white junior high school pupils whose former school building was scheduled for conversion to serve the elementary grades only. These pupils were assigned to the city's one overwhelmingly Negro junior high, which was expected to be approximately half Negro and half white as a result. About 75 Negroes were redistricted from this school to a predominantly white one. About sixty children were to be transported by bus from their overcrowded, predominantly Negro elementary school to attend grades one, two and three at a predominantly white school where there was room for them. Finally, the closing of another school building led to the redistricting of about 100 children, most of them Negro, to a second predominantly white elementary school. The high school situation was hardly at issue, since the construction of a fourth high school building permitted the city to be divided into approximately racially balanced quadrants. This first step on the elementary and junior high school levels was a small and cautious venture that, despite its symbolic importance, would do little to reduce the number of nonwhites attending the three predominantly Negro schools. Similarly, the influx of Negroes into white i:4chools would be relatively slight. While the plan considered racial balance as a criterion for re-assignment and redistricting, it gave precedence to other criteria, such as overcrowding, and was presented to the public in that way.
-11 -When the plan went into effect in September, 1964, only about half of the scheduled pupil transfers actually took place. Most of the attrition occurred among the white youngsters assigned to the predominantly Negro junior high, a proposal that had stimulated the most community friction and opposition. In most cases, the re-assignment was avoided through the use of an "open school" option that had been initiated by the school system a year or two earlier, largely to relieve pressure from inner-city residents who wanted their children to attend the supposedly "better" and usually less crowded schools in more affluent neighborhoods. Under this option, schools not filled to capacity were announced as "open, " and parents throughout the city were permitted to register their children on a first come, first served basis until capacities were reached. The open school program was perceived by school officials as a "safety valve" which would permit Negro parents actively concerned about integration to have their own children integrated without difficulty. In this situation, however, it operated to reduce integration, since it provided a "way out" for re-assigned white youngsters. There was much less attrition among Negro youngsters who were re-assigned in connection with the integration program.
Thus, while even this modest first approved plan was not fully implemented, it did provide some guidelines that were used in formulating plans for September, 1965. Perhaps the most obvious of these is reflected in the school system's subsequent refusal to consider any plan involving the assignment of white pupils to predominantly Negro schools. Unlike the other two plans, which would have integrated predominantly Negro schools as well as predominantly white ones, the plan selected involved closing two of the three predominantly Negro schools and the busing of their pupils throughout the system. Over 1,450 pupils were to be distributed among twenty-two different schools over half the schools in the system compared to the four receiving schools involved in the 1964 plan.
However, the largest predominantly Negro school was not affected by this plan and remains a Centerline problem. But with the relatively quiet implementation of the 1965 plan, the problem of racial imbalance at the j unior high school level seems to have been eliminated, at least for the present. Consideration is currently being given to the remaining predominantly Negro elementary school. In addition, the percentages of nonwhite pupils are rising in other schools, particularly in those located on the periphery of the Negro "ghetto, " and represent potential problems for the community.
-13-CONCLUSIONS It seems evident that the Board of Education, perhaps reflecting majority community sentiment, resisted change and moved only under outside pressure. Over a year passed between the first public awareness of the problem of de facto school segregation and the Board's formal acceptance of racial balance as a criterion for future assignment of pupils. During this period, pressure for the change came from three distinct sources;
(1) the local protest groups led by CORE; (2) the Education Committee composed of representatives of the Board, the school district's admin.'s,. trative staff, the protest groups, and interested citizens; and (3) the State Education Department through the State Commissioner's Special Message on Racial Imbalance. But even by July, 1963, the Board was not fully committed to an active role in effecting school integration. Seven more months passed before the school staff presented a plan to alleviate a small measure of racial imbalance in the schools, and it was an additional seven months before this plan was implemented and some preliminary results known. Throughout this period, influential Board members still maintained that racial balance was a secondary criterion for boundary line revisions and student assignments. It was not until the second plan was presented to the public in March of 1965 that the Board committed itself to a policy of actively seeking school integration. What seems to have been amply demonstrated at each step of the process is that change could not -14 -or would not have occurred in the absence of outside pressure; the Board reacted but did not generate its own momentum.
It seems equally clear that groups outside the established educational power structure, the "protest groups," were primarily responsible for initiating change. Although they did not create or implement the specific plans that emerged, it was they who brought the de facto segregation issue Once the protest groups had established the issue as a source of community concern and conflict, influential members of the community sought to restore equilibrium. In this effort, all parties involved turned to the Education Committee as an "interested third party" informally representing the community as a whole. It is apparent that this role is an important one to understand, and there remains much disagreement about it in Centerline. Some saw the Education Committee as purely an advisory body, while others felt that it should play a more active role by participating directly in negotiations and attempting to mediate. Until the Fall of 1964, the Committee appears Ito have served all these functions. Later, it became involved in formulating a detailed plan for school integration. To the extent that the Committee advocated its own plan, the "interested -15 -third party" role may have been compromised. Whether the Committee will play a significant role in the future is in doubt. At the very least, it seems evident that such a group can serve effectively on a continuing basis only to the extent that its authority and tasks are clearly defined and accepted by all concerned.
Urban communities are not self-contained, autonomous units but are subject to outside influence and authority. Just as the local protests had The new Superintendent took office with much in his favor., Not only was he new to the system, but he had been Superintendent of Schools in a nearby community and was favorably known throughout the Centerline area.
He was in a good position, therefore, to utilize his special influence as a new appointee without being vulnerable to "carpetbagger" allegations. It may also be hypothesized that, since he had changed positions several times to accept increasingly attractive opportunities, his primary loyalties when he came were to his profession rather than to the Centerline Public Schools.
Of course, this may have modified as he became involved in the local situation and helped to develop and implement solutions. Whether because of the new Superintendent or because of a coincidental, natural acceleration of events, progress seemed to occur faster after his arrival. Nothing else approaching a public demonstration occurred, and the authors attribute this in large measure to the forthright leadership exerted by the Superintendent in support of the accommodation that had been reached among the Board, the Staff, the protest groups, and other leading citizens who were involved. Convinced of the need for a united posture to elicit public acceptance, he was able to obtain the active public involvement and support of virtually the entire Board and his administrative lieutenants in "selling" the new plans to the community. As has been mentioned above, this was done without the help of many of the city's leadership groups.
The experience in Centerline suggests, perhaps not surprisingly, that attempts to integrate by assigning white youngsters to schools located in Negro ghetto areas will tend to create greater opposition than will the reverse procedure. In this case, the difficulty was undoubtedly aggravated by the fact that the predominantly white school scheduled for closing served a closely-knit, ethnically homogeneous, working class population probably the kind of group most frightened by racial integration. As has been noted above, most of the families involved were able to avoid integration
by using the open school, policy that had been instituted earlier in an effort to promote it. Thus, the open school policy as a "safety valve" can work both ways to inhibit integration as well as to encourage it. Perhaps this is analogous to the "flight" to the suburbs and to private schools occurring -20 -in many of our cities, often negating integration efforts and presenting an even greater challenge to efforts to move toward a racially integrated society.
In soy case, most slum schools seem to be doing an inadequate job at best, and their staffs and pupils alike seem to be increasingly demoralized.
This suggests the possibility that such schools might best be closed and their pupils and teachers dispersed. If achieving integration increased the number of poorly educated youngsters in our cities, this would be a hollow victory indeed. We would hypothesize, therefore, that integrating by assigning white youngsters to schools in the Negro ghetto is educationally unsound as well as apparently politically untenable.
The authors are aware of the compensatory education programs that have been instituted in many slum schools in an effort to upgrade educational services. One such program has been watched closely since its implementation in Centerline. A detailed analysis of this program is beyond the scope of the present paper, but there seems to be no evidence that it resulted in significantly more effective education in the schools involved. While there may be no short run alternative to such palliatives in large cities, this is not the case in Centerline. More to the point, these programs may retard integration by providing an "excuse" in effect, the "separate but equal" rationale no longer accepted by the courts. In addition, compensatory programs may create new sub-bureaucracies with a vested interest in continued de facto segregation by race or by social class. There does seem -21 -to be evidence that the officials of the compensatory program in Centerline worked against integration and, even in public statements, favored the old status quo. Their expressed rationale was the same as that used by many white parents in opposing integration4-concern for Negro young-_ eters who would not be "ready" to confront a new social group holding different standards of behavior and academic achievement although they did become involved in planning for the change once its direction was clear.
This argument contains a germ of trtAtha enough to make it attractive to those seeking excuses and delays. Slum youngsters may not be "ready"
to attend higher achieving, "middle class" schools, but it seems likely that they will never be ready until they make the confvontatiott. What is needed is special help a wide spectrum of compensatory services for school personnel, and youngsters alike that will enable the newcomers better to cope with and sA2cceed in their new setting. The Centerline experience showed that, when such services were adequate, the transferred pupils had less difficulty making the necessary adjustments. Even those middle-class white citizens who are genuinely concerned that Negro children will be hurt in this process may be vi 'ns of their own projection. Indeed, many whites might not succeed if the tables were turned, since they have had relatively little experience adapting to the standards, values, and demands of populations other than their own. The Negro child, on the other hand, has had to learn to do so. If he can exercise this ability while firmly establishing his personal integrity in predominantly middle-class schools, our entire -22 society will be the richer. The political solution desegregation is, of course, only half the battle. Real integration will require increasing positive efforts within the schools to establish a climate of interpersonal respect and to meet the varying developmental needs of all youngsters involved.
SUMMARY
The present paper is an examination of the evolution and implementation of an educational policy directed toward the elimination of de facto segregation in the public school system of a medium-sized, urban community.
An attempt has been made not only to show the chronological unfolding of
events, but also to analyze the process as an illustration of our democratic institutions at work to harmonize conflicting community interests. The dynamics of group and individual involvement have been explored, although necessarily in less detail than will appear in the complete report, along with the pressures in support of and in opposition to the emerging changes.
It is hoped that the conclusions drawn will be helpful to other communities facing similar or related situations.
